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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The County defendants' position and response to the
Coalition's Brief of Appellants fails to address three vital
issues in this case.

First, the County defendants ignore the

decision in Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d
406 (Utah 1986) where this Court held that a statute which transgresses a constitutional proscription is unconstitutional irrespective of any state purpose being furthered or any public good
being derived.

Consequently, the merits of a statute or the

extent to which it accomplishes perceived public policy is irrelevant to whether the statute passes constitutional muster.

Sup-

posedly -virtuous" laws are not necessarily interchangeable with
"constitutional" ones.
are:

The only relevant inquiries in this case

what specifically does Article XIII, Section 5 prohibit,

and does Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 (1987) ("Section 17-19-15")
attempt to do what the Constitution proscribes.
Second, the County defendants ignore the state constitutional framework by supposing that the Tax Commission's supervisory powers over counties somehow vests the counties' constitutionally delegated powers in the state.

On the contrary, each

county has certain constitutional rights, powers and duties of
self-government, which are inherent in the county, and which cannot be wrenched from their control or subsumed by a supervisory

entity•

In any event, the County defendants ignore the fact that

Article XIII, Section 5 proscribes more th^n the intrusion into
functions or duties of local government officials; Article XIII,
Section 5 also proscribes the use of state tax levy proceeds to
fund local government expenses.
Third, the County defendants ignore the constitutional
founding upon which the state's education system stands.

The

Uniform School Fund is constitutionally mandated, and the funding
mechanism for the Uniform School Fund is thereby constitutionally
authorized.

The Uniform School Fund and the property tax redis-

tribution scheme here challenged are critically dissimilar. Section 17-19-15 cannot be saved by imitating the mechanical operation of the taxing scheme under the Uniform School Fund, as the
County defendants argue, because the constitutional authority for
the fund and constitutional proscription against the property tax
scheme arise from different parts of the Ut^ah Constitution, both
of which must be given effect.

-2-

ARGUMENT
I.

ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 PROHIBITS A STATE
LEVY FOR COUNTY PURPOSES REGARDLESS OF A CONCOMITANT STATEWIDE PURPOSE BEING FURTHERED.
The County

defendants' response

to

the Coalition's

Brief fails to address this Court's holding in Utah Technology,
and for the same reason is fatally defective.

While the County

defendants are quick to cite various provisions of Utah Technology such as

"acts of the Legislature are presumed constitu-

tional, " or

"that the

judiciary

[should] not interfere with

enactments of the legislature where disagreement is founded only
on policy considerations," (Brief of Respondents at 18, 26) the
County defendants did not mention the most significant aspect of
that decision, i.e., its holding.

Utah Technology held that

regardless of how meritorious a statute may be, whether the public thereby benefits or whether the purpose for the statute is to
accomplish a statewide need, if a statute does that which is constitutionally proscribed, the statute is unconstitutional.
the Court's words:
However, the legislature's findings of a
public purpose are of no avail in this
instance. The constitutional convention in
promulgating section 29 and its subsequent
adoption by the electorate of this state have
foreclosed any speculation or further debate
on that issue. . . . The state is foreclosed
from subscribing even though the legislature
may determine that public benefits will flow
therefrom.
-3-

In

Id, at 414.
Thus, the County defendants' repeated statements as to
the merits of Section 17-19-15 - that it serves a statewide purpose, or that the counties supposedly face financial disaster if
it is ruled unconstitutional - are IRRELEVANT.
public benefits thereby is of no consequence."

"Whether the
Utah Technology

at 414. The only relevant inquiries are: what does Article XIII,
Section 5 proscribe, and does Section 17-19-+15 attempt to do what
2
the Constitution prohibits.
In

interpreting

Article XIII, Section

5, the Utah

Supreme Court has made the following statements which explicitly
define what Article XIII, Section 5 prohibits:
Under the constitution the state l^as no power
to make a disposition of county funds, and
require that they be appropriated for other
and different purposes than those for which
by authority of the county they were
collected.
State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061, 1063 (1901).
The power to collect and control the revenues
of a municipality is of the very essence of
local self government.
Upon principle and
the great weight of authority, section 5 of
article
13
of
our
state constitution
1

The County defendants claim of pending financial chaos is
not only irrelevant, it is unsupported by any evidence.
2
For this reason, the County defendants' framing of the first
Statement of Issues is overly broad, and asks the obvious.
-4-

precludes the Legislature from imposing a
license tax upon the inhabitants of a city,
town, or county for the sole purpose of raising revenue for such city, town, or country.
The Best Foods, Inc. v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001,
1003-4 (1935) (emphasis added).
Here [Article XIII, Section 5] is indicated
an intention to have local business transacted and local affairs managed and controlled by local authorities. And the term
-assess,- as here employed, has a comprehensive meaning. It includes the valuation of
property, as well as the levying of the rate
of taxation.
State v. Eldredqe, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 340 (1904).
From Article XIII, Section 5's own language and these
cases, it is conclusive the Utah Constitution prohibits: (1) the
legislature's intrusion into the local affairs of a county; i.e.,
controlling or regulating inherent county functions, specifically
including the assessment

and levying of taxes;

and

(2) the

state's use of the proceeds from a state compelled county levy to
fund county expenditures.

A critically significant, though usu-

ally overlooked aspect of Article XIII, Section 5, is that it
proscribes not only the intrusion by the state into inherently

Eldredqe at 339 and The Best Foods at 1003-4.
Standford at 1063.

county functions, but also precludes state levy proceeds from
being used to fund local county functions and expenses.
5
The later cases have not overruled these early cases,
but reinforce their holdings that the autonomy and independence
of a county must be preserved.
this Court has taken a
years" and that

The County defendants argue that

H

far more pragmatic approach in later

w

[t]hese later cases stress the importance of

granting deference to legislative enactment^ responding to statewide concerns.-

Brief of Respondents at 23.

defendants again err.

In this the County

The County defendants repeatedly fail to

recognize that in determining whether a statute violates a specific constitutional provision, the Court cannot, and should not,
give any deference to the legislature's declarations of public
policy or purpose.

See Utah Technology at 413; Standford at

1062; and Eldredge at 339.

If a statute does what the constitu-

tion prohibits, it cannot be upheld simply because it may be "in
response to statewide concerns.Thus the Court in Tribe did not uphold the apportionment of ad valorem taxes to service revenue bonds issued by the
Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency to finance a redevelopment

5

E.g., Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 540 P.2d 499
(Utah 1975) and Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment,
598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979).
-6-

project merely because a statewide purpose was being furthered.
The reason the Court upheld the statute, or better stated, the
reason the statute was not declared unconstitutional, is because
the revenues collected by the county, which were directed to and
used by the redevelopment agency to service the debt on the revenue bonds, did not violate any specific constitutional constraints.

There was no violation of a specific constitutional

restraint because the redevelopment agency, as extensively discussed in the decision, was not a municipality, but an arm of the
state.
The agency is a quasi-municipal corporation,
a public agency created for beneficial and
necessary public purposes. It is not a true
municipal corporation, having power of local
government, but an agency of the state
designed for state purposes.
Tribe at 503 (emphasis added).
Because of this critical fact, the taxes were not being
used to fund county expenditures in violation of Article XIII,
Section 5, but were directed to the redevelopment agency for its
use.

The same concept is explained in Salt Lake County v. Salt

Lake City

to which Tribe cited as the basis for concluding that

6

In Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City was required by state
statute to reimburse Salt Lake County for the expenses of caring
for delinquent children sent to the county detention home. Salt
Footnote continued on next page.
-7-

no specific constitutional provision was violated.

The County

defendants tout Salt Lake County v. Salt Ijiake City as authority
for their argument that supervisory arms of government can compel
action by an inferior governmental entity.

To some extent, that

is true, but in this case, the County defendants' reliance on
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City obfuscates the issues.

The

holding in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City specifically states
that "what is required of Salt Lake City is required from it as
an arm or agency of the state government, and in no way affects
or interferes with any of its functions as a municipal corporation governing its own affairs."
sis added).

Salt Lake County at 563 (empha-

Once again the County defendants failed to address

the most significant aspect of the case.
The County defendants also cite Tribe to support the
constitutionality of Section 17-19-15 on the theory that the
state may unabatedly *require imposition 0f a tax for or the
diversion of local revenue to [an] identified specific statewide
purpose.-

Brief of Respondents at 24.

In Tribe, this was true

only because the redevelopment agency was an arm of the state;

Footnote continued from previous page.
Lake City argued that the statute requiring reimbursement was
unconstitutional under Article XIII, Section 5.
-8-

thus the levy and distribution of tax proceeds was not to a
county for the purpose of funding inherent county functions and
expenses.

Without discussing the facts in Salt Lake County v.

Murray City Redevelopment, the Court reached the same conclusion
for the same reasons as discussed in Tribe.

The Murray City

Redevelopment Agency was likewise an arm of the state and the tax
proceeds apportioned to it were not used to fund inherent county
7
functions or expenses.
The County defendants attempt to dilute the standards
this Court has already

set

for Article

attempting to distinguish the case law.

XIII,

Section

5 by

For example, the County

defendants incorrectly infer that this Court invalidated

the

statute under scrutiny in Standford under Article XIII, Section 5
because the Court could not find a statewide purpose being furthered.

Again, this ignores the appropriate test.

Even if a

state purpose was present, the Court still would have struck down
the statute because it unconstitutionally interfered with local
county

affairs.

Next,

the

County

7

defendants

attempt

to

It is also important to stress that the Supreme Court in
Murray held that the county was not "being deprived of its power
to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation. w Id. at 1343. This statement implicitly recognizes that
one of the inherent functions of counties is the right "to assess
and collect taxes for all purposes" of that county.
-9-

distinguish the present appeal from Standford by arguing that
there is no intrusion into the local county's affairs since budgets and expenditures under Section 17-19-1$ remain under county
control.

This is not true.

The state's intrusion into county

affairs under Section 17-19-15 continually exists.

No longer

does each county have the discretion to ideritify, budget and levy
for costs the county deems legitimate.

While the local taxpayer

may voice objection to a specific county budget, the resulting
levy reflects twenty-nine counties' budget$, and, consequently,
the local electorate is powerless to control the levy process,
and local officials are unaccountable.

This erosion of local

political power has constitutional significance.
explained

in Salt Lake City v.

As this Court

International Association of

Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1977):
The political power which the people
possess under Article I, Sec. 2, and which
they confer on their elected representatives
is to be exercised by persons respbnsible and
accountable to the people—not independent of
them.8

Article I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All political power is inherent in the
people; and all free governments ^re founded
on their authority for their equal protection
and benefit, and they have the right to alter
or reform their government as phe public
welfare may require.
-10-

The budgets which the counties submit to the state must
fall within certain cost categories set by the state.

The costs

which the counties submit to the state must be certified by the
state.

To argue that the counties retain control over their bud-

gets and expenditures in light of these state controls is to trifle with the plain language of Section 17-19-15.

These state

controls are a prime example of unconstitutional intrusion into
inherent county affairs as proscribed by Article XIII, Section 5,
and as interpreted by case law, both because of the intrusion
into the inherent county functions of assessment, levy and collection of taxes, and because the proceeds of a state levy are
being used to fund inherent county functions and expenses.
II•

THE POWER TO ASSESS, LEVY AND COLLECT TAXES
IS AMONG THE INHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF A COUNTY.
The County defendants once again undermine their own

inherent power and authority to administer their own affairs,
including the assessment, levy and collection of taxes, by arguing that

"[t]he constitutional

separation of state and local

functions has been abolished and the clear supervisory control of
the State Tax Commission has been reinforced.dents at 20.

This is also incorrect.

Brief of Respon-

As a matter of law, the

statement flies in the face of this Court's decisions which

-11-

declare that the sovereignty and inherent political power vested
in local government is paramount to our legal system, and that
the Constitution stands to maintain and project that sovereignty•
As this Court said in Standford:
The constitution was doubtless framed
and adopted with a purpose to prbtect local
self-governments which had existed of a practically uniform character from the early settlement of the country, since whicfh they have
remained undisturbed, and the continued
existence of which is therein assumed, and
from which the liberty of the people spring
and depend.
Id. at 1062.
The

County

defendants'

argument

is

also

confusing

because it interchanges supervisory powers with original powers.
To understand the constitutional proscription of Article XIII,
Section 5, it is necessary to recognize the inherent powers and
responsibilities which are constitutionally vested in local governments; i.e., to assess, levy and collect taxes, to govern its
own affairs, to set its own budgets; tp pay the costs and
expenses of its operations.

The County defendants attempt to

justify Section 17-19-15 as not infringing on these inherent
local powers by identifying various supervisory powers that the
state has over the counties.

The County defendants would have

the Court believe that to claim that
reposed

within

the

statutory

"functions

portfolios

-12-

of

[which] are

locally

elected

officials and financed partially or totally by county general
fund revenues . . . are purely local functions, ignores the significant historical role which the State Legislature and State
Tax Commission have played
Brief of Respondents at 9.

in all

local assessment issues."

From that, the County defendants con-

clude that "the Legislature and Tax Commission have, to a large
degree, completely assumed control of the local administration of
g
the property tax system", and thus Section 17-19-15 does nothing
more than carry out state functions and purposes.

Brief of

Respondents at 11 (emphasis added).
While the Coalition recognizes the Tax Commission's
various roles in county taxation, the Tax Commission's revision
of tax levies or other supervisory powers hardly qualify as constitutionally
instance.

vested

authority

to

levy

taxes

in

the

first

Original powers to levy are vested in the county.

As

this Court has previously stated:
An examination of the constitution will show
that
at
least
by
implication
local
self-government to the people of each county
is intended to be imposed and recognized.
Standford at 1062.

9
This argument is inconsistent because, at the same time, the
County defendants state the "[b]udgets and expenditures remain
under county control." Brief of Respondents at 19.
-13-

After citing various constitutional provisions regarding the establishment and powers of the qounties

this Court

concluded:
The constitution implies a right of local
self-government to each county, and a right
to establish a system of county government is
expressly recognized and enjoined*
Id.
This Court has also recognized the need to protect
these constitutional safeguards:
While the implied restrictions upon the power
of the legislature with reference to local
self-government are not defined with the particularity and incisiveness they could have
been, yet they are imperative in ^heir character, and when the courts find 4 case presented for consideration which is clearly
within such provisions it has no alternative
but to conform to authority.
Id., accord. Utah Technology.

See Sections 1 and 4, Article XI, which recognize the
existence of the several counties as legal subdivisions of the
state and the establishment of a system of county governments;
Section 3, Article XIV, which prohibits any county from creating
any indebtedness in excess of the taxes for the current year
without a vote of the electors thereof; Section 6, Article XIV,
which prohibits the state from assessing thq debt of any county;
Section 3, Article XI, which prohibits the legislature from
changing county lines without a vote of the electors of the
counties interested; and finally, Section 5, Article XIII, which
prohibits the Legislature from imposing taxes for the purpose of
any county, but may vest the corporate authorities thereof, with
the power to assess and collect taxes for the purpose of such
corporation.
-14-

In State v. Eldredge, this Court similarly stated:
The constitution of this state, the same as
of every other state, was framed with local
self-government in view.
The idea which promotes our whole system is
that local authority shall manage and control
local affairs.
Eldredge at 339-340.
Finally, this Court in The Best Foods stated:
There can be no doubt but that the framers of
our Constitution recognized the rights of the
people of Utah to local self-government. It
was to preserve local self-government free
from needless legislative interference that
the power to levy taxes for local purposes
was by the state constitution vested exclusively in the proper authority of counties,
cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. The power to collect and control the
revenues of a municipality is of the very
essence of local self-government.
The Best Foods at 1003.
The County defendants would have the Court ignore these
constitutionally mandated county rights and powers to assess,
levy and collect taxes as a means of funding county operations
simply because the state has various supervisory powers.
the state's

supervisory powers

include a

While

responsibility to

ensure equalization, the state's ultimate authority over equalization does not give it the right to assess, levy or collect
taxes for county purposes or to fund county expenditures.

-15-

To illustrate this principle, an analogy to our present
court system is appropriate.

Article VIII, Section 1 vests the

judicial power of the state in the Supreme Court and the district
courts (and such other courts as the legislature establishes).
The Supreme Court by and large is an appellate court and has various supervisory roles and powers.

The Supreme Court adopts

rules of procedure and evidence for use in the state courts. The
Supreme Court is responsible to manage th£ appellate process.
The Supreme Court may authorize retired justices and judges pro
tempore to perform any judicial duties.

the Supreme Court is

also responsible for governing the practioe of law, including
admissions and disciplinary matters.

Certainly the Supreme Court

is extensively and intimately involved in the supervision and
administration of the legal system, including the supervision of
the district courts.
District courts have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by the constitution or statute.

This

jurisdictional authority is inherent in the district court and
cannot be ignored or usurped irrespective of any supervisory control a higher court has over the district cc^urt.

Everyone would

agree that while the Supreme Court exercises extensive supervision and control over the district court, the Supreme Court does
not have original jurisdiction over most masters.
-16-

This concept

is at least as old as Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 171
(1803) where Chief Justice John Marshall, speaking for the United
States Supreme Court, wrote:

"If congress remains at liberty to

give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution
has declared its jurisdiction shall be original; and original
jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be
appellate; the distribution of justice, made in the constitution;
is form without substance."

The same principle applies to the

state's supervisory powers over taxation-

Although the state has

a great deal of involvement in supervising local matters, there
is no constitutional authority for the state to perform those
duties the Constitution vests in local governments.

In fact,

that is Article XIII, Section 5's very purpose - to prohibit such
an intrusion.
Finally, it must be emphasized that Article XIII, Section

5

also

prohibits

state

intrusion

into

local

affairs

vis-a-vis using the proceeds of a state levy to fund county
expenditures.

The County defendants lose sight of this fact in

their repeated arguments that the state' s supervisory and equalization powers do not intrude into the counties * inherent duties
and responsibilities.

Nowhere do the County defendants discuss

why the use of state levy proceeds to fund local expenditures
does not violate Article XIII, Section 5.
-17-

In fact, the County

defendants repeatedly indicate that Section 17-19-15's purpose is
to fund inherently county expenses•

Beqause Section 17-19-15

imposes a state levy, the proceeds of which are used to fund
local county expenditures, the statute is ^constitutional under
Article XIII, Section 5.
III.

THE UNIFORM SCHOOL FUND STANDS ON AN ENTIRELY
SEPARATE CONSTITUTIONAL FOOTING.
Article X, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution mandates

that the "Legislature shall provide for the

establishment and

maintenance of the state's education system."

Section 5 of Arti-

cle X provides for the establishment of th£ Uniform School Fund
for the support of the state's education system, and the means by
which the Uniform School Fund is to be funded.
of authority, the Constitution

By a delegation

authorize$ the Legislature to

appropriate revenues to fund the Uniform Scphool Fund.

Pursuant

to that constitutional delegation of authority, the Legislature
enacted a taxing scheme to raise revenues for the Uniform School
Fund.

Seef e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-902 (1989).

That taxing

scheme involves the redistribution of revenues raised from state
levies to various school districts.

11

Th$ crucial difference

"The statute under attack
is a
funding
mechanism
designed . . . [for] paying the costs of assessing, collecting
and distributing property taxes." Brief of Respondents at 17.
-18-

between this taxing scheme and Section 17-19-15 is, that while
the taxing mechanism to fund the Uniform School Fund is not specified in the Constitution, the legislature was constitutionally
delegated the authority to create such a funding mechanism. 12

x

*
Article X, Section 5 must be construed in pari materia or as
a comprehensive whole with Article XIII, Section 5, giving effect
to both if possible. See State Board of Education v. State Board
of Higher Education, 505 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1973). To the extent
these provisions as to the levy and distribution of taxes for
public schools conflict, Article X, Sections 1 and 5 would
control over Article XIII, Section 5 because the former are a
specific provision (vesting the legislature with authority to
establish and maintain a public school system) whereas the latter
is a general provision (proscribing the imposition of state taxes
for the purpose of any county) . See, e.g., de'Sha v. Reed, 572
P.2d 821 (Colo. 1977). Prior to 1973, ad valorem taxation for
education was constitutionally vested in school districts and
separated from the counties.
Former Article X, Section 6
(repealed in 1973 by the electorate; see laws 1971, Senate Joint
Resolution No. 2) provided: "In cities of the first and second
class the public school system shall be controlled by the Board
of Education of such cities, separate and apart from the counties.This meant, as construed by this Court in Board of
Education v. Burgon, 217 P. 1112, 1113 (Utah 1923) that the Board
of Education had "the right to determine its revenues without
interference or restriction by the county."
(Emphasis added.)
Historically, city school districts* power to tax has always
originated from a different constitutional source than the
counties' power to tax. The Uniform School Fund does not violate
Article XIII, Section 5 because the latter section's coverage is
restricted to "any county, city, town or other municipal corporation," not school districts.
Notwithstanding the repeal of
Article X, Section 6, ad valorem taxation for school districts is
not restricted by Article XIII, Section 5.
Utah Code Ann.
§ 53A-2-108(2) (1989), consistent with Article XIII, Section 5,
states: "Each school district shall be controlled by its board of
education and shall be independent of municipal and county
governments."
-19-

The distribution scheme for the Uniform School Fund stands upon
the same constitutional footing as the establishment of the fund
itself • Here again, this concept is at lea$t as old as M'Culloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 407 (1819), whe£e Chief Justice John
Marshall, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, wrote:
The government which has a rigl^t to do an
act, and has imposed on it the 4uty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the
means; and those who contend that it may not
select any appropriate means, th^t one particular mode of effecting the object is
excepted, take upon themselves th^ heavy burden of establishing that exception.
The County defendants repeatedly refer to the taxing
scheme under the Uniform School Fund for authority that Section
17-19-15 is equally constitutional.
defendants state that Section 17-19-15

Specifically, the County
M

w^s closely modeled on

the financing mechanism for the state supported minimum school
program

(Uniform School Fund)."

This argument is specious.

Brief of Respondents at 15.

The mere fact t^hat Section 17-19-15

adopts the mechanics of the taxing scheme under the Uniform
School Fund does not give Section 17-19-15 equal constitutional
approbation.

Clearly the taxing scheme und^r the Uniform School

Fund stands on entirely different constitutional footing than do

-20-

state imposed ad valorem taxes.

The state has the constitu-

tional right and obligation to fund public schools; it has no
similar

constitutional

right

to

impose

taxes

for

a

county

purpose.
The County defendants also refer to Utah Code Ann.
S 59-2-318 (1987) which provides that the costs of preparation of
plat maps is to be borne by the Tax Commission and appropriated
out of the Uniform School Fund to the counties.

The County

defendants maintain that this statute is likewise identical to
Section 17-19-15. Here again the County defendants are mistaken.
In response, it is necessary to consider Section 59-2-318*s purpose.

The County defendants indicate that "as part of its effort

to guarantee accuracy of assessment for purposes of equality
within the equalized tax levy supporting the Uniform School Fund,
the Legislature . . . provided that uniform minimum standards in
real property plat maps used by counties for property tax assessments would be established. . . . w

13

Brief of Respondents at 13.

As set forth in the Coalition's Brief of Appellants, the
Utah Attorney General has similarly stated that "a legislative
scheme requiring taxes to be collected by counties for the
benefit of school districts has been distinguished from a scheme
requiring taxes to be collected by counties for their own use."
Attorney General, Formal Opinion No. 88-01, February 11, 1988
(citing Board of Education v. Burgon, 62 Utah 102, 217 P. 1112
(1923) and Board of Education v. Daines, 12 Utah 97, 166 P. 977
(1917).
-21-

Hence, the purpose of revising plat maps wa3 to ensure the equality of assessment of the taxing scheme und^r the Uniform School
Fund.

For this reason, the costs of this statute is borne by the

Uniform School Fund.

As discussed above, the Uniform School

Fund, and the costs and expenses which it supports are constitutionally sanctioned under Article X.
IV,

SECTION 17-19-15 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATES
REVENUE SHARING.
Article XIII, Section 5 only permits the consensual

sharing of taxes with other political subdivisions of the state.
The County defendants repeatedly claim that the various organizational associations of counties support Seption 17-19-15.

The

Coalition does not dispute this fact, although that fact is, once
again, irrelevant.

The relevant fact is that no county has taken

official action to

adopt and incorporate tljie provisions of Sec-

tion 17-19-15. Neither has any county taken any requisite action
to authorize the sharing of tax proceeds with other counties.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-2 (1989) provides that a county must exercise its power "only by board of county commissioners or by
agents and officers acting under authority of the board or
authority of law.w

Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-^.6.5 (1989) similarly

states:
Any county, city, town or other lo^al political subdivision may, at the discretion of the
-22-

local governing body, share its tax and other
revenues with other counties, cities, towns
or other local political subdivision.
Any
decision to share tax and other revenues
shall be by local ordinance, resolution, or
interlocal agreement.
Section 17-19-15, with its mandatory revenue sharing,
is

a

state

statute,

interlocal agreement.

not

a

local

ordinance,

resolution

or

Moreover, the counties have not provided,

by affidavit or otherwise, any local ordinance, resolution, or
other interlocal agreement between counties by which revenue
raised through ad valorem taxation will be shared.
V.

THE COALITION HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 17-19-15.
For the reasons set forth in the Coalition's Brief of

Appellants, Section I, pages 12-15, the Coalition members have
standing to contest the constitutionality of Section 17-19-15.
CONCLUSION
Article

XIII,

Section

5

prohibits

the

state

from

intruding upon inherent county functions such as the assessment
levy and collection of ad valorem taxes and using the proceeds of
state levies to fund inherent county expenses.

Section 17-19-15

does exactly what Article XIII, Section 5 proscribes because
under the statute, state officials compel the counties to levy an
ad valorem tax and then redistribute tax revenues generated by
-23-

the state levy to fund county expenses•

Section 17-19-15 is

unconstitutional on its face.
DATED this

day of

1990.

JAMES B. LEE
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER
MAXWELL A. MILXER
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLfl & LATIMER
Attorneys for Coalition
185 South Statie Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898J
Salt Lake CityL UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (80|1) 532-1234
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